Brussels School of International Studies

OBJECTIVE: To review and update the evidence for different forms of manual therapy (MT) and exercise for patients with different stages of non-specific neck pain (NP). DATA SOURCES: MEDLINE, Cochrane-Register-of-Controlled-Trials, PEDro, EMBASE. METHOD: A qualitative systematic review covering a period from January 2000 to December 2015 was conducted according to updated-guidelines. Specific inclusion criteria only on RCTs were used; including differentiation according to stages of NP (acute - subacute [ASNP] or chronic [CNP]), as well as sub-classification based on type of MT interventions: MT1 (HVLA manipulation); MT2 (mobilization and/or soft-tissue-techniques); MT3 (MT1 + MT2); and MT4 (Mobilization-with-Movement). In each sub-category, MT could be combined or not with exercise and/or usual medical care. RESULTS: Initially 121 studies were identified for potential inclusion. Based on qualitative and quantitative evaluation criteria, 23 RCTs were identified for review. Evidence for ASNP: MODERATE-evidence: In favour of (i) MT1 to the cervical spine (Cx) combined with exercises when compared to MT1 to the thoracic spine (Tx) combined with exercises; (ii) MT3 to the Cx and Tx combined with exercise compared to MT2 to the Cx with exercise or compared to usual medical care for pain and satisfaction with care from short to long-term. Evidence for CNP: STRONG-evidence: Of no difference of efficacy between MT2 at the symptomatic Cx level(s) in comparison to MT2 on asymptomatic Cx level(s) for pain and function. MODERATE to STRONG-evidence: In favour of MT1 and MT3 on Cx and Tx with exercise in comparison to exercise or MT alone for pain, function, satisfaction with care and general-health from short to moderate-terms. MODERATE-evidence: In favour (i) of MT1 as compared to MT2 and MT4, all applied to the Cx, for neck mobility, and pain in the very short term; (ii) of MT2 using sof-tissue-techniques to the Cx and Tx or MT3 to the Cx and Tx in comparison to no-treatment in the short-term for pain and disability. CONCLUSION: This systematic review updates the evidence for MT combined or not with exercise and/or usual medical care for different stages of NP and provides recommendations for future studies. Two majors points could be highlighted, the first one is that combining different forms of MT with exercise is better than MT or exercise alone, and the second one is that mobilization need not be applied at the symptomatic level(s) for improvements of NP patients. These both points may have clinical implications for reducing the risk involved with some MT techniques applied to the cervical spine.

The article traces the emergence of “reorganized” capitalism as consecutively the fourth modality of capitalism – after the 19th century entrepreneurial form, the post-liberal “organized” capitalism of the welfare state, and the “disorganized” neo-liberal model of the late 20th century. The features of the fourth modality emerge from an analysis of (1) the key dynamics of social stratification, (2) the matrix of state-society relations, and (3) the structure of electoral mobilization in advanced industrial democracies.

Abstract For more than a decade, key international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the UN and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) have argued that investment in information communication and telecommunication (ICT) infrastructure is a prerequisite for the development of poor countries. However, dissenting voices of the international development community argue that African governments should focus their attention on building schools, delivering basic health care, electricity and clean water rather than on the building of costly ICT infrastructure with their limited financial resources. In this paper, we present an analysis of the relationships among investments in ICT, Health Care and Education and the human development index on five West African nations. We use a Stepwise regression analysis to help unravel the complex relationships among these variables. Our results provide evidence that complementary investments in ICT, health and education can significantly increase development. Given that developing nations are making considerable investments in healthcare, education and ICT and that there are concerns over the type of investments they should make, our findings are a significant contribution to the literature.

What are the ethical pitfalls of countering hybrid warfare? This article proposes an ontological security-inspired reading of the EU and NATO’s engagement with hybrid threats. It illustrates how hybrid threat management collapses their daily security struggles into ontological security management exercise. This has major consequences for defining the threshold of an Article 5 attack and the related response for NATO, and the maintenance of a particular symbolic order and identity narrative for the EU. The institutionalisation of hybrid threat counteraction emerges as a routinisation strategy to cope with the “known unknowns”. Fostering resilience points at the problematic prospect of compromising the fuzzy distinction between politics and war: the logic of hybrid conflicts presumes that all politics could be reduced to a potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. Efficient hybrid threat management faces the central paradox of militant democracy whereby the very attempt to defend democracy might harm it.

Over the last decade we have witnessed an increasing politicisation of the energy discourse. Today energy relations of the EU are framed in terms of excessive dependence on Russia, qualifying the latter as a security threat. This article puts forward four criteria to define energy relations in security terms: supply vulnerability of the EU, the absence of Russian demand dependence, the dominance of energy over other capabilities, the willingness to link energy to foreign policy objectives. Little support is found to define the dependence on the import of Russian energy resources as a security issue. An alternative explanation is given, attributing growing energy concerns to shifting identities and perceptions in EU-Russia relations, which have contributed to understanding energy relations in competitive and geopolitical terms. Russia has developed a more assertive energy diplomacy, while in the EU sensitivity over energy dependence has grown as a result of changes on the global energy market and of the 2004 enlargement.

This book examines the migration, integration and transnational activity of overseas Americans – American migrants – in France, Germany and the UK. It examines the reasons for their migration, introdu

Abstract In this article, through comparing two highly skilled migrant groups in London, we explore how new types of information and communication technologies (ICTs) shape the form and content of transnational practices through time and space. In so doing, we aim to contribute to several debates in the field of migration studies. First, our findings highlight enduring practical constraints emanating from everyday routines and responsibilities, thus questioning the extent to which ICTs may be shrinking the globe and freeing people, even highly skilled ones, from spatial and temporal fixity. Second, we challenge assumptions about the ease of transnationalism by exploring the range and complexity of long‐distance interpersonal relationships and their dynamics over time. Third, by focusing on a comparison of relatively affluent, highly skilled migrants, we question the usefulness of the category of ‘middling migrants’. Our findings illustrate that, within this general and wide ranging category, there are diverse experiences, expectations and opportunities of maintaining contact with friends and family at home.

How can ritual help to understand the practice of deterrence? Traditional deterrence scholarship tends to overlook the active role of deterring actors in creating and redefining the circumstances to which they are allegedly only reacting. In order to address the weight of deterrence as a symbol, collective representation and strategic repertoire, this article proposes to rethink deterrence as a performative strategic practice with ritual features and critical binding, releasing and restraining functions. I posit a ritual account of deterrence to better grasp the performance, credibility and the presumed effect of this central international security practice. An understanding of deterrence as a ritual-like social practice probes the scope of rational deterrence theory, replacing its ‘I think, therefore I deter’ presumption with a socially and politically productive ‘I am, therefore I deter’ logic. Drawing on the example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s enhanced Forward Presence, the proposed conceptualization of extended deterrence as an interaction ritual chain in allied defence, solidarity and community-building offers novel insights about the deterrence and collective identity nexus. Extended deterrence has much more than deterrence at stake: how an alliance practices deterrence tells us more about the alliance itself than about the nature of threats it responds to. The tripwire posture of the enhanced Forward Presence highlights the instrumentality of ritualization for mediating ambiguity in extended deterrence.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, universities across the world radically shifted to emergency remote teaching. Since then, many universities have moved forward considerably and many lessons were learned in the area of online education. The aim of this qualitative study is to investigate how university teachers in a Belgian university experienced online education since the start of the pandemic and what exactly influences their experiences with online education. Six online focus groups (with thirty-two lecturers) revealed both enthusiasm and stress, and six tension fields that influenced their experiences with online education during COVID-19: (1) connection with students, (2) connection with colleagues, (3) digital opportunities and threats for students' learning processes (online student feedback, online interaction, structured learning materials, flexibility in time and space), (4) changing teacher roles, (5) tension due to time pressure and (6) support issues. Every tension field contains both opportunities and threats for online education, which can inform practitioners of online education in the future of university education.

Security strategies are important sites for narrating the EU into existence as a security actor. The unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately post-Brexit could be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the purposes of contributing to global security in a particular way. This paper offers a brief stock-taking of the EU’s way of writing security from the European Security Strategy (2003) to the EU Global Strategy (2016). A concise exegesis of these documents exposes an interesting dynamic: as exercises in ordering the world, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be major exercises in ordering the self. The comparative snapshot shows the EU as increasingly anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about its actual convincingness as an ontological security framework for the EU’s constituent members over time.

This open access short reader discusses the emerging patterns of sedentary migration versus mobility of the highly-skilled thereby considering different ways of defining the highly skilled migrant and providing a comprehensive overview of the recent literature on highly-skilled migration.

Abstract Ever since the Court's judgment in Walrave, there has been a concerted effort in caselaw and doctrine to limit the horizontal direct effect of free movement provisions to exceptional circumstances. This article suggests that this effort has always been incoherent, and is simply untenable after Viking and Laval. The implications are far reaching, especially in the sphere of the free movement of capital and corporate governance where the Court is well on its way of imposing a model of shareholder primacy on European company law. Full direct horizontal effect will also have important repercussions for private law and its ability to resolve conflicts between economic freedoms and fundamental rights. Given the nature of the free movement provisions, their horizontal effect will sometimes lead to a constitutionalised market and sometimes to a marketised constitution, without there being any principled way of distinguishing between the two. In that light, horizontal direct effect is very unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of internal market law—whichever model of the social market economy it is thought to embody—and is best abandoned.

Abstract This article theorises the nexus between mnemonical status anxiety and militant memory laws. Extending the understanding of status-seeking in international relations to the realm of historical memory, I argue that the quest for mnemonical recognition is a status struggle in an international social hierarchy of remembering constitutive events of the past. A typology of mnemopolitical status-seeking is presented on the example of Russia ( mnemonical positionalism ), Poland ( mnemonical revisionism ), and Ukraine ( mnemonical self-emancipation ). Memory laws provide a common instance of securing and/or improving a state's mnemonical standing in the relevant memory order. Drawing on the conceptual analogy of militant democracy, the article develops the notion militant memocracy , or the governance of historical memory through a dense network of prescribing and proscribing memory laws and policies. Similar to its militant democracy counterpart, militant memocracy is in danger of self-inflicted harm to the object of defence in the very effort to defend it: its precautionary and punitive measures resound rather than fix the state's mnemonical anxiety problem.

This article scrutinises the role of discourses on the manipulative use of information for Russia–West relations. Debates on so-called information warfare have gained prevalence both in the West and in Russia. Applying a poststructuralist framework, the comparative analysis discusses how these discourses work, respectively, how they interact, and what this interaction implies for Russia–West relations. While the contemporary discourses facilitate a confrontational stance of both Russia and the West towards the respective Other, it is argued, first, that these dispositions are malleable. On the long run, Russia–West relations are thus not condemned to remain hostile. Secondly, both sides still speak to some extent the same language. However, if the current cooldown prevails, this common discursive ground may fade and give way to more fundamental confrontational stances. Finally, by revealing each other's contingency, discourses in both countries make it appear less natural which interpretation is ‘true’ or ‘right’.

To understand the gradual worsening of EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, it is essential to understand the dynamics of their interaction. This article divides EU–Russia relations into three stages on the basis of changing intergroup dynamics: asymmetrical cooperation (1992–2003), pragmatic but increasing competition (2004–2013) and conflict (2013–present). It draws on the concept of ‘attributional bias’ to explain the escalating logic of competition during the second stage. The EU and Russia started to attribute each other negative geopolitical intentions up to the point where these images became so dominant that they interpreted each other’s behaviour almost exclusively in terms of these images, rather than on the basis of their actual behaviour. With the Ukraine crisis, EU–Russia relations changed from competition over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood and over normative hegemony to conflict over direct control.

Russia–EU relations have often been presented in terms of a normative gap, with the EU appearing as a normative and Russia as a non-normative actor. This article critically analyses this ‘normative argument’ which sees this gap as the cause of tensions. Pleading for a less dichotomous approach to norms and interests, it challenges the normative argument on the basis of the assumed congruence between the norm-driven input and norm-promoting output of European foreign policy. As an alternative, the article explores how the normative agenda in Eastern Europe serves instrumental purposes. Selective norm promotion has the potential to change the hierarchy of identities among post-Soviet states.

Against the historical backdrop of the codification debate in nineteenth century Germany, this article traces the reassertion of “legal science” as an autonomous source of European legal integration in current legal and political discourse about the harmonization of European private law. The article argues that a grasp of widely shared ideas about the role and function of legal science and legal scientists is vital both toward an understanding of the extraordinary impact of the academic project of a European civil code on legal and political discourse in the Union in particular, and toward furthering the theory of legal fields in general.

This contribution argues that the European Union (EU) promotes two forms of democracy in its policy towards Ukraine: formal democracy (institutions and procedures at polity level guaranteeing a free and fair electoral process) and substantive democracy (principles and mechanisms that allow for an ongoing societal control over policy processes). While the first form of democracy is mainly promoted through intergovernmental channels, the latter is promoted both at a transgovernmental and more weakly at an intergovernmental level. The question raised is why more progress has been made in formal democratic reforms in Ukraine (between 2006 and 2009), than in the field of substantive democracy. Two explanations are put forward: the higher visibility of formal democratic reforms in the framework of Ukraine's legitimacy seeking with the EU and the strategic behaviour of domestic actors. It is argued that institutional democratic reforms are regarded as the litmus test for Ukraine's feasibility for future EU membership and act to a degree as a sort of ‘self-imposed’ conditionality. This, however, is counterbalanced by strategic behaviour of domestic actors, resisting deeper democratic change to compensate for the power they lose as a result of a more democratic electoral process. The EU's one-sided emphasis on the promotion of formal democracy over substantive democracy facilitates this.

The dominant explanation for limited rule transfer under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is its weak incentive structure, in particular the absence of a membership perspective. However, a certain rule transfer has occurred, albeit in a strikingly selective and uneven way. This article formulates an alternative model for explaining the variance in rule transfer under the ENP. Refuting conditionality and asymmetrical interdependence as having insufficient explanatory value, rule transfer is explained on the basis of three interrelated factors. First, the usefulness of ENP provisions for domestic agendas. Secondly, the process of active legitimacy‐seeking with the EU, driven by the subjective perception of accession prospects. Thirdly, the institutional design of the ENP itself, in particular its differentiated approach and lack of finality, which give the policy a strong political character.

Russian norm diffusion has been studied mainly as the mirror image of the EU’s, but deserves to be studied in its own right and complexity. Three core categories of political norms are explored: sovereign choice, regime and conservative ideas. It is argued that Russia does not promote a coherent political model, by lack of one, but rather diffuses a disparate set of conservative ideas and non-democratic practices. Russia’s normative positioning is equivocal. It champions established international norms like sovereignty, placing itself within the dominant normative community, but contesting the application by the West. When it comes to certain liberal political norms (often reduced to a strawman version), it questions their validity and rejects them, placing itself outside the dominant normative community, but claiming to defend “genuine” European values. This makes Russia an ambiguous norm contester, rather than the perfect normative rival of the EU. The complexity of its norm contestation follows from exogenous motives: it is predominantly an anti-hegemonic reaction against what it perceives as the Western imposition of norms, harming vital Russian interests.