Global Governance Centre

ABSTRACT As more and more governments release national strategies on artificial intelligence (AI), their priorities and modes of governance become more clear. This study proposes the first comprehensive analysis of national approaches to AI from a hybrid governance perspective, reflecting on the dominant regulatory discourses and the (re)definition of the public-private ordering in the making. It analyses national strategies released between 2017 and 2019, uncovering the plural institutional logics at play and the public-private interaction in the design of AI governance, from the drafting stage to the creation of new oversight institutions. Using qualitative content analysis, the strategies of a dozen countries (as diverse as Canada and China) are explored to determine how a hybrid configuration is set in place. The findings show a predominance of ethics-oriented rather than rule-based systems and a strong preference for functional indetermination as deliberate properties of hybrid AI governance.

Initiated in 2002, the International Environmental Agreements Data Base (IEADB) catalogs the texts, memberships, and design features of over 3,000 multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements. Using IEADB data, we create a comprehensive review of the evolution of international environmental law, including how the number, subjects, and state memberships in IEAs have changed over time. By providing IEA texts, the IEADB helps scholars identify and systematically code IEA design features. We review scholarship derived from the IEADB on international environmental governance, including insights into IEA membership, formation, and design as well as the deeper structure of international environmental law. We note the IEADB’s value as a teaching tool to promote undergraduate and graduate teaching and research. The IEADB’s structure and content opens up both broad research realms and specific research questions, and facilitates the ability of scholars to use the IEADB to answer those questions of greatest interest to them.

International policy discussions on plastic pollution are entering a new phase, with more than 100 governments calling for the launch of negotiations for a new global plastics agreement in 2022. This article aims to contribute to efforts to identify effective international policy levers to address plastic pollution. It takes stock of the evolution of views and perceptions on this complex and multi-faceted topic—from concerns about marine pollution and waste management towards new strategic directions that involve the entire plastics life-cycle and include climate and health impacts associated with the proliferation of plastics. It also traces the progressive development of responses—from voluntary approaches involving multiple stakeholders to national and international approaches focused on regulation. The paper is informed by desk research, a literature review and participation by the authors in informal and formal global governance processes on plastic pollution, the environment and development in the United Nations and World Trade Organization between 2019 and 2021. It also draws on empirical findings from a novel and original database on the life-cycle of plastic trade created by the authors. The paper argues that the important focus on downstream dimensions of plastic pollution—and strategies to address them—needs to be complemented by a broad life-cycle and “upstream” perspective that addresses plastic pollution at its source. It highlights the political economy tensions and inconsistencies at hand, observing that while some countries are taking concerted efforts to reduce pollution (including through bans on certain kinds of plastic and plastic products); to promote more circular plastic economies; and to reduce the carbon footprint of plastics (as part of a wider effort to decarbonize their economies), trade and investment in the plastic industry continues to rise. The paper argues that to reduce plastic pollution, emerging global governance efforts must integrate international environmental law and cooperation with a complementary and enabling global framework that addresses the economic, financial, industrial and trade policies needed to drive the necessary transformation of the plastics sector.

Sanctions have become the "go to" mechanism for addressing foreign and security challenges in the international arena. The European Union’s willingness to impose autonomous (or unilateral) restrictive measures on third countries, and in particular on Russia, has come to the fore at a time when the uptake of new sanctions through the United Nations (UN) framework has stalled. This trend appears to reflect a growing ability to forge consensus among the EU’s Member States and use its economic power to support its foreign policy goals. This article considers the extent to which the EU has succeeded in forging a leadership role in sanctions for itself among non-EU states. It examines the alignment or adoption by non-Member States with its sanctions regimes and finds that the EU has a demonstrable claim to regional, if not yet global, leadership.

This special issue is the first to systematically address the activity we call “normfare” - the assiduous development of norms of very different character (public and private, formal and informal, technically mediated and directly implemented) by different actors (platforms, standard-setters, states) as an answer to the wide range of challenges facing internet governance. We bring together contributions from leading anthropologists, technologists, political scientists, legal and communication scholars exploring how norms underpin the new ordering of the internet, whether in explicit or implicit forms. Through various theoretical lenses, contributions analyze the impact of platforms, states, civil society, expert groups and key individuals on restructuring the normative order of the internet, and present empirical evidence for instances of norm creation, legitimation, contestation and opposition. Valuable new insights for norm development processes come from case studies, ethnographies, legal and discourse analysis and interdisciplinary approaches locating agency and power plays. In this introduction, we define the key concepts applicable to norm entrepreneurship and discuss their interplay in internet governance debates, followed by an overview of the articles included in the special issue. In the final section, we reflect on the implications of our new research agenda.

Recent research argues that external threats like war spur EU polity formation (Kelemen & McNamara, 2022). One key mechanism of this process is public support for policy responses designed by policymakers. However, like the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect (Mueller, 1970), public support wanes over time and we decompose this decrease into two elements: salience and polarisation at the domestic level for national and European policies in both soft and hard security (aid and sanctions). We show that while salience can sustain public support for European policy innovations, polarisation about national and (unexpectedly) European policies accelerates its decline. We thus qualify the story of EU polity formation through external security crises.

Abstract The fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises a powerful, reliable and fast infrastructure to match artificial intelligence and Internet of Things developments. But its rollout has stirred strong political tensions around the prominent role that Chinese providers might be allowed to play in building the new networks. Between 2018 and 2020, a few countries have banned—partially or totally—the use of networking equipment produced by Huawei and ZTE, while others have mandated technical and security reviews to mitigate the risks associated with Chinese-origin components in the national 5G infrastructure. This article provides a thematic analysis of the security arguments and policy options emerging in the early days of the 5G debates. Based on key high-level statements, parliamentary debates and legislative acts published from mid-2018 to 2020, we examine perceived risks and threats surfacing in the public discourse, as well as the main regulatory directions emerging in seven countries. Our analysis shows policy alignment across multilateral commitments such as the European Union (EU) or the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. While selected EU member states lean towards risk-based governance and adaptive policies, Five Eyes nations opt for pre-emptive bans of 5G Chinese vendors, revealing path-dependent strategies for the sector. We conclude by discussing the policy reversal experienced by the UK in 2020 and the consolidation of new governance approaches for 5G infrastructure.

Abstract This article builds on existing literature on digital inequality and the digitised welfare state to elucidate one underexplored way in which the rise of e‐government platforms further disadvantages already‐marginalised people: by requiring that they possess a verifiable digital footprint distributed across multiple public and commercial platforms. We illustrate the pertinence and nuances of this particular risk through lived experience research in a UK public library where limited users receive help with digital skills. Although there is a growing recognition of both the inevitability of digital welfare and the risks to marginalised communities, little work has been done to connect these abstract policy discussions to lived experience—to pinpoint how digitisation creates these exclusions, beyond simply having internet access or not. This article argues that the prerequisite of a digital footprint engenders a double disadvantage: (1) lacking a digital footprint is the result of barriers that are largely invisible to data‐driven, digital‐by‐default systems, and (2) when marginalised users establish a sufficient footprint, this entails a disproportionately onerous responsibility for managing a distributed personal data trail in the long term. This combination of mundane barriers and the burden of responsibility for a digital identity points to policy implications for governments aiming to advance inclusive digital transformation agendas.

Abstract Since the late 1990s, targeted sanctions and general humanitarian sanctions exemptions have aimed at avoiding the disastrous humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions. In parallel, global banks in charge of administering the international trade of vital goods (food and medicine) have received guidance on how to implement risk-based approaches to avoid completely blockading sanctioned jurisdictions. But these efforts have failed. This article asks: Why has the governance of sanctions and sanctions exemption failed, and what can be done to fix the problem? It argues that a hybrid form of governance in the field of sanctions is responsible for current humanitarian problems. Based on more than eighty interviews with treasury officials, sanctions experts, compliance officers, and others, and taking the international trade of vital goods in Iran as an example, this article assesses various fixes to the governance failures and solutions to address the payment problems that exporters of vital goods in sanctioned jurisdictions face.

Abstract What is at stake for how the Internet continues to evolve is the preservation of its integrity as a single network. In practice, its governance is neither centralized nor unitary; it is piecemeal and fragmented, with authoritative decision-making coming from different sources simultaneously: governments, businesses, international organizations, technical and academic experts, and civil society. Historically, the conditions for their interaction were rarely defined beyond basic technical coordination, due at first to the academic freedom granted to the researchers developing the network and, later on, to the sheer impossibility of controlling mushrooming Internet initiatives. Today, the search for global norms and rules for the Internet continues, be it for cybersecurity or artificial intelligence, amid processes fostering the supremacy of national approaches or the vitality of a pluralist environment with various stakeholders represented. This book provides an incisive analysis of the emergence and evolution of global Internet governance, unpacking the complexity of more than 300 governance arrangements, influential debates, and political negotiations over four decades. Highly accessible, this book breaks new ground through a wide empirical exploration and a new conceptual approach to governance enactment in global issue domains. A tripartite framework is employed for revealing power dynamics, relying on: (a) an extensive database of mechanisms of governance for the Internet at the global and regional level; (b) an in-depth analysis of the evolution of actors and priorities over time; and (c) a key set of dominant practices observed in the Internet governance communities. It explains continuity and change in Internet-related negotiations, opening up new directions for thinking and acting in this field.

Abstract Over the past few years, Yemen has become synonymous with mediation failure. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the early 2010s, when the United Nations played a crucial role in persuading Yemen’s long-serving President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to step down from power and, at least initially, successfully steered the country during the ensuing political transition. By analyzing UN mediation efforts during the mandate of Special Adviser Jamal Benomar, the article draws attention to the multiple shifting benchmarks for success. It adopts a phase-differentiated approach to mediation evaluation, which not only allows for recognition of earlier successes, but also enables an analysis of relevant factors influencing mediation success or failure in different stages of the mediation process. In the final instance, the analysis suggests that the eventual failure of UN mediation in Yemen can be traced to conflict and contextual factors rather than the mediator or the mediation process.

Accounting was designed to facilitate economic growth and, as such, tends to reinforce dynamics that are harmful to the environment. Promoted today as a corrective, green accounting is often portrayed as a pioneering intervention. Yet, green accounting is not new. This paper situates it within a genealogy of initiatives developed since the 1980s and assesses their potential to establish an infrastructure capable of supporting a post-growth transition or redirecting capital toward nature conservation. It argues that, across its various iterations, green accounting has consistently struggled to materialize as a genuine infrastructure for either purpose. Nevertheless, the promises it carries help pre-empt capitalism’s crisis of legitimacy in the face of mounting socio-ecological crises.

Abstract The involvement of private actors in global policymaking has received significant scholarly attention in IR. Existing accounts have shown how entities such as corporations, businesses, and philanthropies build their authority to become legitimate actors and shape global politics. This paper argues that contemporary global dynamics, such as the financialisation of development and the rise of multistakeholderism, have ushered in a trend where private actors are not only seen as legitimate delegated authorities but also embraced as fully fledged political equals indispensable for addressing societal problems. To understand this shift, it is necessary to move beyond an examination of legitimation strategies to interrogate, instead, how private actors shape what are seen as ‘apt’ or ‘deviant’ ways of knowing and acting upon problems. Through an examination of what I call ‘political normalisation’ in the field of global food governance, I show how through concrete practices – individualising social problems, defining institutional aptness, and cultivating the landscape – private actors not only cultivate a perception of themselves as rightful global governors but also shape the parameters of what rightful governing ought to be. More broadly, this shift invites us to further complicate the public–private divide and assess the novel ways through which private actors ‘do’ politics.

This article explores the normative and institutional implications of the long-term use of individual sanctions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It identifies the systematic and extensive use of individual sanctions as the most fundamental qualitative change in international sanctions policy during this century. It argues that policy is developing towards their use not only in order to address international crises and disputes of relatively limited scope and duration, but also to address enduring criminal activities, notably (but not exclusively) related to terrorism. While these sanctions remain associated with threats to international peace and security in the classic sense, they have in many cases transformed into long-term confiscations of individual assets, instead of temporary freezes. The UNSC, designed to address international crises on an exceptional basis, now engages in permanent sequestrations and is tasked with the monitoring of individual criminal activities on a massive scale. While individual sanctions have on some occasions proven effective, their systematic use by inadequate institutions complicates the Council's implementation of sanctions and undermines its legitimacy.

Abstract During crises, do emergency politics impair the EU polity by alienating Europeans? Recent literature suggests that executive decisions in hard times can spur negative European sentiment, increase polarisation in the public and thus create more problems than solutions. The Covid-19 pandemic offers an ideal opportunity to study this important issue. However, studying mass sentiment towards the EU is mostly constrained by imperfect survey data. We tackle this challenge with an empirical strategy that combines two original data sources: first, we use policy process analysis to identify key EU decisions; second, we leverage Twitter data to measure sentiment. As a result, we can study whether key EU decisions impacted EU sentiment and whether this impact is conditional on the level of EU competence, prior politicisation and problem pressure. We find that EU decisions impact EU sentiment positively and do not polarise it (even among highly politicised decisions). Low prior politicisation and healthcare-related decisions increase the positive impact of EU actions. There is thus no punishment of the EU for acting outside its remit. Our findings have important implications for the politics of polity maintenance in the EU.

Abstract Do states take court decisions into account when formulating policies? If so, how do they process new judicial input and make policies in response to them? While self-interest and incentives are the usual elements involved in a rational choice explanation of policymaking, behavioralist scholarship casts doubt on whether decisionmakers are able to identify and pursue their interests in a rational manner. We draw on rational and behavioral approaches to formulate different expectations about the process of policymaking and updating in the context of maritime delimitation. We focus on how states formulate policies about the appropriate method of maritime delimitation given relevant decisions of the International Court of Justice. Using a dataset of continental shelf delimitation policies, we find evidence that at least some states change policies in line with court decisions. However, we are unable to distinguish between mechanisms consistent with rational choice and those suggested by behavioralism. We discuss why behavioralist explanations of policymaking processes are difficult to test in a large-N setting. Moreover, we discuss why additional evidence from interviews also proves insufficient, notably due to actors’ tendency to rationalize state policies. We end by suggesting how these problems can be addressed in future research.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to changing conditions throughout its long history. At its centenary, the ILO must once again respond to evolving circumstances and find new ways to engage state and private actors participating in an interconnected global economy where labour standards continue to be violated and where work itself is undergoing significant transformations. This chapter explores recent efforts by the ILO’s leadership to reassert the organisation’s role in broader global policy contexts. Part one presents the concept of institutional layering in order to understand better the agents of change and the structures in which they operate. The three sections that follow demonstrate institutional layering across three core dimensions of global governance—actors, rules, and mechanisms—in the period since 1998. The chapter concludes that the ILO’s current governance practices have mixed prospects for the organisation’s role in a changing governance landscape. New layers of soft law rules and flexible governance mechanisms can potentially augment the ILO’s global standing moving forward. Its lack of representativeness and its continuing engagement of new actors, however, demand further formal changes to the ILO’s institutional apparatus.

The making of international law through multilateral conventions and adjudication often leads to periods of legal uncertainty, times in which there are alternative rules and divergent views on how they ought to be applied to particular cases. I argue that legal uncertainty gives states opportunities and incentives to formulate excessive unilateral claims, thus making disputes more likely to arise. I illustrate my argument with a comprehensive analysis of maritime boundary disputes in the aftermath of the Second World War. In this period, the law regulating maritime boundary-making has been marked by varying degrees of uncertainty due to different rules and interpretations proffered by various multilateral and judicial lawmaking attempts. I find strong evidence that high legal uncertainty is associated with an increased probability of dispute onset. The analysis calls for an important rethinking of the impact of legalization on international affairs, both in maritime boundary-making and in other issues areas.

Abstract After being kidnapped by the FARC-EP guerrilla group in 1994, the Colombian war reporter Herbin Hoyos created the radio show Las Voces del Secuestro (roughly, The Kidnapped Voices). Every morning, for 24 years, the families of those abducted by the guerrilla group sent out public messages of remembrance, hoping that their loved ones, deep in the jungles of Colombia, would be able to hear the broadcasts on their radios. Although the show closed in 2018, its legacy lives on, not only in the collective memory of many Colombians but also as an exhibition at the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum in Geneva (Switzerland). This article examines this show as a dispositif of power and knowledge that (re)produces a particular understanding of law, justice and memory. The show was used by far-right actors in Colombia to mobilise against the recent (2016) peace process – its crown jewel, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). As the JEP tackles the question of the FARC-EP kidnapping through its macro-case 01, the shadow of the Voces looms large over Colombia's transitional justice system. In the longest non-international armed conflict in Latin America, even radio waves served the continuation of war by other means.

Abstract The number of global environmental institutions has increased dramatically over the past decade. Yet environmental governance is widely seen as failing. Focusing on biodiversity politics, we argue that many key governance institutions, particularly those advancing market solutions, are themselves deeply implicated in this persistent failure. Drawing on the sociology of expertise, we show how two recently established institutions – the European Business and Nature Platform and the Network for Greening the Financial System – attempt to address the uncomfortable reality of biodiversity governance failures and the risks of their own future failures by creating a series of diversions to deflect attention and by displacing the focus of biodiversity governance from core issues to their own efforts to develop metrics. These dynamics render these institutions both ‘failure-proof’ and inherently ‘failure-prone’, ultimately reinforcing rather than resolving the problems they aim to address.