Hochschule für Politik München

As a result of various crises, the European Union (EU) witnessed the rise of Eurosceptic and/or populist parties in its member states. However, the link between Euroscepticism and populism remains under-theorized, and the East-Central European (ECE) region is still surprisingly under-studied. This paper aims to fill these gaps by studying the development of Eurosceptic populist narratives in Hungary and Poland. Connecting the literature on Euroscepticism and the ideational approach to populism, it is shown through Orbán’s and Kaczyński’s discourses how (1) the EU is equated with ‘the corrupt elite’ that stands in conflict with ‘the pure people’, the Hungarians and Poles, and (2) how the EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty. While the article highlights differences between the Eurosceptic populist narratives of the two party leaders, a politically driven ‘anti-imperialist’ theme prevails in both cases, which differentiates them from their Western-European counterparts as well.

During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.

Abstract Efforts to set standards for artificial intelligence (AI) reveal striking patterns: technical experts hailing from geopolitical rivals, such as the United States and China, readily collaborate on technical AI standards within transnational standard‐setting organizations, whereas governments are much less willing to collaborate on global ethical AI standards within international organizations. Whether competition or cooperation prevails can be explained by three variables: the actors that make up the membership of the standard‐setting organization, the issues on which the organization's standard‐setting efforts focus, and the “games” actors play when trying to set standards within a particular type of organization. A preliminary empirical analysis provides support for the contention that actors, issues, and games affect the prospects for cooperation on global AI standards. It matters because shared standards are vital for achieving truly global frameworks for the governance of AI. Such global frameworks, in turn, lower transaction costs and the probability that the world will witness the emergence of AI systems that threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Abstract The politics of representation has become increasingly complex in recent years. Amid weakening traditional political cleavages, the emergence of new political divides and mounting anti-elitism that have helped the rise of radical populist parties, voters face significant cross-pressures when casting their ballots. Despite a wealth of studies on the role of issue preferences in voting behaviour, there are still many unknowns when it comes to understanding how voters trade off competing issue preferences against each other. Studying issue trade-offs is also important against the backdrop of the well-documented preferences of radical left and right voters for redistribution and restrictive immigration policies, respectively. To investigate the strength of issue preferences among radical left, radical right and mainstream party voters and the willingness to compromise on their most important issues, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with 2,000 participants in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The voting scenario in the experiment featured proposals on salient political issues and different (non)populist stances on political representation. The results from the cross-country study, as well as a large replication study with a sample of 4,000 German respondents, show that voters of radical right parties are willing to accept large trade-offs regarding their other issue preferences as long as their preference for restrictive immigration policies is fulfilled. Differently, radical left, Green and mainstream party voters have a more variegated range of issue preferences, some of them so strong that they are not traded off for their preferred redistribution and European Union integration positions, respectively. The findings shed light on trade-offs related to emerging issues such as climate change and the distinct logics behind support for radical parties. They also have implications for the electoral prospects of mainstream and radical parties when trying to reposition themselves in the diversifying issue space of contemporary democracies. As such, understanding how voters navigate issue cross-pressures helps to explain the broader dynamics that are (re)configuring political conflict and voting behaviour in Europe.

When faced with highly heterogeneous national conditions and preferences, the EU has often resorted to differentiation to ensure political support for advancing common policies. Despite growing scholarly interest in differentiation in the EU, conceptual clarity and empirical evidence of different forms of differentiation are still in a nascent stage. Particularly the use of differentiation in times of crisis needs to be better understood. To address this research gap, we investigate differentiation in the EU renewable energy policy in response to the crisis stirred by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We find that the EU successfully used the Ukraine crisis to increase the ambition of renewable energy policy, but this was accompanied by various and often novel forms of differentiation. Rather than formally exempting countries from common EU provisions (differentiated integration), EU decision-makers strategically incorporated flexibility in implementation, often tailored to a few outlier countries. Strategic flexibility was instrumental in overcoming political disagreements among national governments and adopting a more ambitious and comprehensive renewable energy policy. Our findings contribute conceptually and empirically to understanding various forms of differentiation in EU policymaking and how they are employed to facilitate the building of political majorities during crises.

We conduct a large (N = 6567) online experiment to measure the features of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that citizens of six European countries perceive to lower the risk of transmission of SARS-Cov-2 the most. We collected data in Bulgaria (n = 1069), France (n = 1108), Poland (n = 1104), Italy (n = 1087), Spain (n = 1102) and Sweden (n = 1097). Based on the features of the most widely adopted public health guidelines to reduce SARS-Cov-2 transmission (mask wearing vs not, outdoor vs indoor contact, short vs 90 min meetings, few vs many people present, and physical distancing of 1 or 2 m), we conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to estimate the public's perceived risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in scenarios that presented mutually exclusive constellations of these features. Our findings indicate that participants' perception of transmission risk was most influenced by the NPI attributes of mask-wearing and outdoor meetings and the least by NPI attributes that focus on physical distancing, meeting duration, and meeting size. Differentiating by country, gender, age, cognitive style (reflective or intuitive), and perceived freight of COVID-19 moreover allowed us to identify important differences between subgroups. Our findings highlight the importance of improving health policy communication and citizens' health literacy about the design of NPIs and the transmission risk of SARS-Cov-2 and potentially future viruses.

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ABSTRACT Amid continued public controversy and political debate about online speech governments and civil society have pushed social media platforms to increase transparency around how they regulate speech, through community guidelines and content moderation systems, to support users to hold companies accountable for content removals. But how well do users understand apply platform content rules? We report results of two complementary studies. In Study 1, lab participants were randomly assigned to judge whether posts violated the guidelines of 10 platforms. Users' interpretations of the guidelines were inconsistent with each other, especially for platforms with longer documents. In Study 2, we preregistered an experiment testing whether shortened versions of Meta's guidelines improved understanding. Reducing length without simplifying moderation rules did not lower disagreement about what content the platform moderates. Taken together, our results indicate substantial room to improve the interpretability of community guidelines, enabling users to evaluate moderation more reliably. These findings highlight design tradeoffs and motivate clearer, example‐driven guidance.

Bibliographie: Brodocz, André/Schölzel, Hagen/Suntrup, Jan Christoph: Temporalstrukturen des Ausnahmezustands. Editorial der Gastherausgeber, ZPTh – Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie, 2-2023, S. 171-183. https://doi.org/10.3224/zpth.v14i2.01-----Open-Access-Lizenz: Dieser Beitrag ist ab dem 21.05.2024 im Open Access unter der Creative-Commons-Lizenz CC BY 4.0 (Namensnennung 4.0 International) verfügbar. Weitere Informationen zur Lizenz und den Nutzungsbedingungen finden Sie hier.

To what extent do economic preferences and institutional trust predict compliance with physical distancing rules during the COVID-19 pandemic? We reexamine this question by introducing the theoretical and empirical distinction between individual health behaviors in the public and in the private domain (e.g., keeping a distance from strangers vs. abstaining from private gatherings with friends). Using structural equation modeling to analyze survey data from Germany's second wave of the pandemic (N = 3350), we reveal the following major differences between compliance in both domains: Social preferences, especially (positive) reciprocity, play an essential role in predicting compliance in the public domain but are barely relevant in the private domain. Conversely, individuals' degree of trust in the national government matters predominantly for increasing compliance in the private domain. The clearly strongest predictor in this domain is the perception pandemic-related threats. Our findings encourage tailoring communication strategies to either domain-specific circumstances or factors common across domains. Tailored communication may also help promote compliance with other health-related regulatory policies beyond COVID-19.