Hochschule für Politik München

As a result of various crises, the European Union (EU) witnessed the rise of Eurosceptic and/or populist parties in its member states. However, the link between Euroscepticism and populism remains under-theorized, and the East-Central European (ECE) region is still surprisingly under-studied. This paper aims to fill these gaps by studying the development of Eurosceptic populist narratives in Hungary and Poland. Connecting the literature on Euroscepticism and the ideational approach to populism, it is shown through Orbán’s and Kaczyński’s discourses how (1) the EU is equated with ‘the corrupt elite’ that stands in conflict with ‘the pure people’, the Hungarians and Poles, and (2) how the EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty. While the article highlights differences between the Eurosceptic populist narratives of the two party leaders, a politically driven ‘anti-imperialist’ theme prevails in both cases, which differentiates them from their Western-European counterparts as well.

Technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI) represent a crucial governance challenge for policymakers. This study contributes to the understanding of how states plan to govern AI with respect to the role they assume and to the way they develop AI in a responsible manner. In different policy instruments across 22 countries plus the European Union, there is considerable variation in how governments approach the governance of AI, both regarding the policy measures proposed and their focus on public responsibility. Analysing a set of policy instruments we find multiple modes of AI governance, with the major difference being between self-regulation-promoting and market-based approaches, and a combination of entrepreneurial and regulatory governance approaches. Our analysis also indicates that the approach to public responsibility is largely independent of the chosen policy mix of AI governance. Therefore, responsibility seems to be a cross-cutting issue that cannot be tied to a specific approach of states towards technology.

Artificial Intelligence raises new, distinct governance challenges, as well as familiar governance challenges in novel ways. The governance of AI, moreover, is not an issue of distant futures, it is well underway – and it has characteristics akin to ‘herding cats’ with a mind of their own. This essay introduces the contributions to the special issue, situating them in broader political and social science literatures. It then provides a sketch of an interdisciplinary research agenda. It highlights the limits of 'explainable AI', makes the case for considering AI ethics and AI governance simultaneously, identifies as an underappreciated risk 'system effects' that arise from the introduction of AI applications, and calls for policymakers to consider both the opportunities and the risks of AI. Focusing on the (ab)uses of AI, rather than the complex, rapidly changing and hard-to-predict technology as such, might provide a superior approach to governing AI.

How can populists potentially extend their time in power? Departing from the notion that populism is a “thin-centered” ideology, the article argues that as long as populists manage to continuously (a) reconstruct “the elite” and “the people,” (b) reinforce the antagonistic relationship between “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people,” and (c) remodel popular sovereignty, it is likely that they can lengthen the life expectancy of their regime. Analyzing the case of Hungary starting in 2010, the article demonstrates that Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán was successful with respect to this “three-course approach.” He managed to reconstruct “the elite” from “representatives of the past” to a “homo sorosensus,” and widened the scope of “the people” from “we, Hungarians” to “we, the sovereign nations.” Similarly, Orbán renewed the conflict between the ever changing elite and “the people,” turning from economic-driven to identity politics. Finally, Orbán reinvented a toolkit of new, innovative measures that reflected a preference for greater popular sovereignty. The article builds on an analysis of Orbán’s selected speeches and corresponding political and legal measures initiated by the regime that formed an integrative part of the “three-course approach” in Hungary.

Abstract This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule‐takers to rule‐makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT‐GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT‐GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT‐GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy‐specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule‐takers will become regime‐transforming rule‐makers, regime‐undermining rule‐breakers, resentful rule‐fakers, or regime‐strengthening rule‐promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime‐supporting rule‐takers.

In spring 2022, the German federal government announced responses to the 2022 cost-of-living crisis. These included among others, a nationwide local public transport ticket for 9 Euro per month. Available only in June, July, and August 2022, it allowed for unlimited travel on all local and regional public transport services in Germany. In transport policy research, this is an almost unprecedented behavioral experiment that allows studying travel behavior and the effectiveness of such instruments. We observed this natural experiment with a three-wave survey and a smartphone-based semi-passive travel diary based on waypoint tracking. We recruited 2,316 participants, out of which 907 agreed to participate in the tracking; the latter are primarily located in the Munich metropolitan region, and most got the 9-Euro-Ticket. 1,454 respondents have completed the three-wave survey and 684 respondents completed the survey and provided travel behavior data with the smartphone app. We find that public transport use increased particularly for 9-Euro-Ticket customers who had no travel pass before. Regular public transport use increased from 29 % before to 38 % during and to 32 % after the 9-Euro-Ticket for our nationwide panel, where around 20 % of 9-Euro-Ticket substituted at least some private transport trips with public transport during the 9-Euro-Ticket. The tracking results show that local public transport travel distances decreased by 37% after the 9-Euro-Ticket for solely 9-Euro-Ticket owners and by 30 % for travel pass holders. Further, discontinuing the 9-Euro-Ticket led to around one-third fewer active public transport users than those with the 9-Euro-Ticket but no travel pass before. The 9-Euro-Ticket caused the expected modal shift, but despite its low price, not all private transport trips were substituted, implying that such a policy instrument alone arguably does not suffice to achieve a successful mobility transition.

Abstract Efforts to set standards for artificial intelligence (AI) reveal striking patterns: technical experts hailing from geopolitical rivals, such as the United States and China, readily collaborate on technical AI standards within transnational standard‐setting organizations, whereas governments are much less willing to collaborate on global ethical AI standards within international organizations. Whether competition or cooperation prevails can be explained by three variables: the actors that make up the membership of the standard‐setting organization, the issues on which the organization's standard‐setting efforts focus, and the “games” actors play when trying to set standards within a particular type of organization. A preliminary empirical analysis provides support for the contention that actors, issues, and games affect the prospects for cooperation on global AI standards. It matters because shared standards are vital for achieving truly global frameworks for the governance of AI. Such global frameworks, in turn, lower transaction costs and the probability that the world will witness the emergence of AI systems that threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms.

During TTIP negotiations, the European Commission was severely criticized by civil society organizations and public opinion for its secrecy regarding negotiation strategies and priorities. The Commission responded by making some negotiating texts publicly available. This article explores the implications of increasing transparency in trade negotiations. Drawing on negotiation, politicization, and informal governance literature, it examines how the Commission’s choice for a partial transparency approach had three paradoxical effects on negotiations. First, greater transparency did not help the public perception of TTIP. Second, greater transparency increased the EU’s bargaining leverage but led to a low degree of negotiating discretion for the Commission. Finally, greater transparency transformed the nature of the negotiating process by making it more informal, allowing bargaining parties to act outside the public scrutiny. This contribution solves these transparency puzzles by showing that partial transparency is a double-edged sword. Whilst greater transparency has become an important legitimation strategy in EU trade governance, adopting a partial transparency approach fuelled public protest instead of muting it and led to the failure of the negotiations.

Abstract The politics of representation has become increasingly complex in recent years. Amid weakening traditional political cleavages, the emergence of new political divides and mounting anti-elitism that have helped the rise of radical populist parties, voters face significant cross-pressures when casting their ballots. Despite a wealth of studies on the role of issue preferences in voting behaviour, there are still many unknowns when it comes to understanding how voters trade off competing issue preferences against each other. Studying issue trade-offs is also important against the backdrop of the well-documented preferences of radical left and right voters for redistribution and restrictive immigration policies, respectively. To investigate the strength of issue preferences among radical left, radical right and mainstream party voters and the willingness to compromise on their most important issues, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with 2,000 participants in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The voting scenario in the experiment featured proposals on salient political issues and different (non)populist stances on political representation. The results from the cross-country study, as well as a large replication study with a sample of 4,000 German respondents, show that voters of radical right parties are willing to accept large trade-offs regarding their other issue preferences as long as their preference for restrictive immigration policies is fulfilled. Differently, radical left, Green and mainstream party voters have a more variegated range of issue preferences, some of them so strong that they are not traded off for their preferred redistribution and European Union integration positions, respectively. The findings shed light on trade-offs related to emerging issues such as climate change and the distinct logics behind support for radical parties. They also have implications for the electoral prospects of mainstream and radical parties when trying to reposition themselves in the diversifying issue space of contemporary democracies. As such, understanding how voters navigate issue cross-pressures helps to explain the broader dynamics that are (re)configuring political conflict and voting behaviour in Europe.

Sanctions are widely used foreign policy tools in reaction to crises in world politics. Accordingly, literature on sanction effectiveness—their intended consequences—is abundant. Yet, fewer studies address the unintended consequences of restrictive measures. This is remarkable given that negative externalities are well documented. Our article explores this phenomenon by asking under which conditions sanctions yield negative externalities. We develop a theoretical conceptualization and explanatory framework for studying the unintended consequences of UN sanctions. Empirically, we draw on data from the rich, but scarcely used Targeted Sanctions Consortium and apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine negative externalities of UN sanctions, complemented by illustrations from the cases Haiti and North Korea. The results document the existence of multiple pathways toward unintended consequences, highlighting the negative impact of comprehensive and long-lasting sanctions, as well as the ability of autocratic targets with economic means to persist unscathed from sanctions.

Transitions to sustainability require not only structural policy reforms, but a rethinking of how policy-relevant expertise is produced. Scholars of Science and Technology Studies have used the concept of boundary work to examine how governments mobilize experts to establish epistemic and political authority for public policies. Less attention has been paid to the ways in which boundary work affects the scope of policy options to advance sustainability transitions, notably in the context of sociotechnical lock-in of dominant technologies. This article analyzes French pesticide regulation on alternatives to glyphosate in agriculture to reveal the governance implications of the construction of expertise. It examines how state actors and scientific experts performed cognitive and sociopolitical boundary work to affect both the framing of government-commissioned scientific reports and the institutions and policy instruments through which the government addressed the glyphosate problem. The article analyzes the factors that shaped the development of a novel regulatory instrument which restricts the use of glyphosate based on the availability and costs of alternatives, rather than on health or environmental risks alone. This process limited the framing of glyphosate alternatives to practices considered economically and practically feasible by selected experts and excluded more systemic alternatives from policy debate and instrumentation. The adoption of this regulatory instrument reflects specific institutional contexts, power differentials between governmental ministries, and the hidden political influence of a powerful agricultural sector and agrochemical industry. This article shows how expertise design plays a key role in defining the scope of policy options and determining allocations of political power.

Abstract Background To achieve climate targets, a transition to low-carbon energy production is necessary. However, conflicts between different interests, values and priorities, particularly at the community level, can constrain this transition. This paper aims to analyze lines of conflict and opportunities to build bridges between conflicting interests in the expansion of wind energy in Germany at the local level, to achieve successful implementation of wind energy projects. Results Our analysis of four cases of local-level wind energy projects in Germany shows that limited local options for action reinforce the need for local actors to maximize the benefits of energy transition projects. In addition to the conflict over scarce space, the lines of conflict at the local level run primarily along the dimensions of costs and benefits, winners and losers. Real or perceived procedural and distributive injustices had the potential to fuel resistance to wind energy projects in the analyzed cases. However, wind energy projects were successfully implemented despite the presence of local opposition. Conclusions The results show that, by integrating procedural and distributive justice into the project planning and implementation and offering tailored solutions, community support for expansion of renewable energy projects can be enhanced. The paper advances the concept of societal ownership (“gesellschaftliche Trägerschaft”), which suggests the willingness of members of a community to tolerate decisions even when some conflicts related to the decision remain unresolved. Societal ownership is presented as an alternative to the concept of simple acceptance; it implies a more positive, more supportive community attitude, where members aim to address conflict as a normal aspect of decision making. Rather than sweeping alternative opinions aside, the community addresses alternative viewpoints, seeking to achieve greater procedural and distributive justice. In this way, a sense of societal ownership of a project can develop, enhancing its likelihood of success.

Abstract The Danish political party Alternativet is an example of a party based on deliberative values, which quickly gained electoral success after its formation in 2013. It has been represented in the national parliament since 2015 and subsequently in local councils. One of the party’s stated goals is to promote a “new political culture”, which is embedded in six debate principles that stress the importance of listening sincerely to arguments and always providing justifications for ideas. This article analyses how the party has juggled with upholding these ideals whilst also maintaining electoral competitiveness and pursuing influence in legislative assemblies.

Although populists in government have already frustrated the common interest projects, curbed the institutional progress, and questioned the fundamental values of the European Union, integration theories have so far failed to address the question: what explains populist governments’ actions within the EU? This article claims that existing accounts either downplay the relevance or fail to grasp the complexity of populist governments, because populism disputes the democratic models and state-societal relations projected by these theories. Merging the literature on populism and theories of European integration, it is argued that populism in government exerts a transformative impact on both the democratic institutions and the society within a member state, which could have important ramifications for future integration. Highlighting the anti-plural and anti-democratic nature of populism, and the emergence of a ‘constraining consensus’ between populist governments and ‘the people’, the article proposes a complementary approach in addressing the populist challenge for European integration.Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: 10.1080/01402382.2021.1988388

Political connections provide substantial benefits to firms. We emphasize the ownership of firms as an important channel through which political connections operate and identify a resulting link between political turnover and turnover in the ownership of firms: Political turnover prompts newly politically connected individuals to take, and newly disconnected individuals to cede, ownership of firms. This pattern should be more pronounced in countries with weaker property rights, among firms with publicly recorded owners, and among firms with more immobile assets. Moreover, firms that experience changes to ownership during periods of political turnover should have elevated political connections and therefore pay less taxes and earn higher profits. Analyses of the ownership structure of firms in 87 countries are consistent with the theory. Because politically connected owners allow firms to compensate for other vulnerabilities, the theory also explains mixed findings in prior work on the consequences of asset immobility.

Abstract Many scholars predict that European integration will foster adversarial legalism in Europe. In this article, I empirically assess the Eurolegalism thesis by examining EU regulatory mandates in the competition and securities fields, two policy areas where adversarial legalism is seen as most likely to develop. I argue that the diffusion of adversarial legalism to Europe has faced significant political opposition in the EU policymaking process which has curtailed the use of private enforcement mandates in EU secondary legislation. European policymakers have relied more on administrative enforcement through public regulatory agencies, a mode of policy implementation closer to bureaucratic legalism. In practice, public authorities play the primary enforcement role and private litigation serves the narrower function of compensation following public enforcement actions. Drawing from institutionalist theory, I identify several factors that have encouraged the development of bureaucratic rather than adversarial styles of European legalism, especially member states' commitments to procedural subsidiarity, the negative feedback effects from the US experience with entrepreneurial litigation, and the stickiness of European legal and bureaucratic traditions.

The European Central Bank’s (ECB) role as a political actor during the euro crisis raised concerns about its independence and insufficient accountability. Against this backdrop, the article investigates how and why the ECB reacted to demands for more accountability during and following the crisis. To this end, we revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, recurring to the governor’s dilemma, we argue that a delegation relationship characterized by a high level of independence favours competence over controllability. Second, we open the black box of accountability by investigating the extent to which the ECB made the strategic choice to improve selected accountability dimensions. Third, against the commonsensical view that ECB accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped, this piece shows that certain accountability dimensions have been continuously improved to defend independence. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational institutions.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly being adapted for news production tasks in news outlets worldwide. Whether the public trusts news outlets relying on AI to produce news remains unclear. Further, the economic implications (willingness to pay and ad acceptance) and moderators remain unexplored. We conducted a pre-registered 2 × 2 experiment with a quota-based nonprobability sample from Germany (N = 1,261). Respondents were exposed to vignettes about a fictional online news outlet. We manipulated the production process (generative AI vs. trained journalists, between-subject) and the topic covered (politics vs. entertainment, within-subject). Participants trusted outlets with AI-generated news less, particularly political ones. They were less willing to accept seeing ads shown by AI outlets and outlets that covered entertainment. Willingness to pay was not affected. We explored moderators: Individuals with the perception that AIs spread incorrect information were less trusting in AI-generated news. These perceptions did not moderate the relationship with willingness to pay or ad acceptance. The opinion climate did not moderate the effect of the content production process. In sum, AI in the newsroom may decrease trust and ad revenue of outlets. This effect might be exacerbated depending on audience characteristics. We discuss implications for theory, future scholarship, and media organizations.

Zusammenfassung Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur zum deutschen Föderalismus ist überaus vielfältig. Neben Analysen der institutionellen Arrangements, ihrer Veränderungen sowie der Dynamiken des deutschen Verbundföderalismus, finden sich auch zahlreiche Untersuchungen zu einzelnen Politikfeldern, die sowohl die Interaktionen zwischen Bund und Ländern als auch die Varianz zwischen den Policies der Länder samt ihrer Bestimmungsfaktoren untersuchen. Darüber hinaus haben sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten eigene Forschungszweige zu Parteien im Bundesstaat und zur Parlamentsforschung auf Länderebene etabliert. Trotz dieser großen Forschungsaktivität sind jedoch einige zentrale Fragen der Politikwissenschaft zum Zusammenspiel zwischen Wählern, Parteien, Parlamenten und Regierungen sowie deren Wirkung auf politischen Outputs und Outcomes weiterhin unbeantwortet. Dies ist, so das Argument dieses Beitrags, insbesondere der fehlenden Zusammenführung einzelner Literaturstränge und der noch unzureichenden empirischen Datenbasis geschuldet. Mittels einer Systematisierung des gegenwärtigen Literaturstands entwirft der Aufsatz ein Forschungsprogramm, das auf eine umfassende Analyse des politischen Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses in den deutschen Bundesländern abstellt und Fragen der Responsivität und Rückkopplung systematisch in den Blick nimmt.

Despite gaining attention, climate clubs focused on phase-outs – terminating specific substances, processes, or technologies – have yet to be systematically assessed. This study analyses different aspects of six phase-out clubs, including the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA). Aspects include: (1) membership size and composition; (2) adopted obligations; (3) member compliance; (4) member benefits; and (5) club function within the climate regime. The first three aspects come from regime effectiveness theory, while the last two come from club theory. Findings reveal these clubs as state-led, multi-stakeholder coalitions aiming to complement the Paris Agreement and build global momentum within the UNFCCC to phase out fossil fuels. The Global Methane Pledge, potentially the most effective club, combines low entry barriers, deep commitments, material and other exclusive member benefits, and members represent a large share of targeted emissions.