Refugee Law Initiative

Forced displacement generated by organized crime is a little-studied and poorly understood phenomenon. Based on field research carried out in 2013, this article redresses this situation by analysing the broad dynamics of an alarming new wave of forced displacement sweeping El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – the countries of the Northern Triangle of Central America – and Mexico. It focuses specifically on the role played by three of the main types of organized criminal groups in the region – mara street gangs, Central American drug transporters, and Mexican drug cartels – in provoking this displacement. Structural differences between these groups are shown to influence both the forms of displacement that they produce and the resulting patterns of movement by displaced persons. Consideration is then devoted to the implications for scholarship and humanitarian practice of this new wave of forced displacement generated by organized criminal groups.

Despite the importance of refugee resettlement being frequently emphasised, there is only a limited amount of empirical research on why an increasing number and variety of States admit refugees through resettlement, when it is not an obligation under international law. This article first sets out the four traditional perspectives on States’ motives for resettlement, based on well-established theories of International Relations, namely egoistic self-interest, altruistic humanitarianism, reciprocity, and international reputation. After examining the applicability of each of the traditional perspectives in light of past and recent resettlement practice in a deductive manner, the article puts forward a different hypothesis: that States perceive resettlement as an alternative to asylum in terms of migration management, given the recent empirical and discursive trend. While the article by no means suggests that such a perception is a justifiable explanation for States’ motives for resettlement, the perception seems to add a different and relevant hypothesis when tracing the logic behind States’ increasing interest in resettlement.

Abstract How does internal displacement compare to other related forms of movement? This article draws on existing evidence to explore, specifically in countries affected by armed conflict or other serious violence, how internal displacement relates empirically to (1) internal economic migration as a more voluntary form of “internal” movement and (2) refugee flows as an external form of “forced” movement. This analysis of the available evidence suggests a shift may be needed in the ways in which research and policy frame internal displacement.

Across the globe, the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated particular challenges for internally displaced people (IDPs). Over 1.9 million people in Myanmar have been displaced due to the escalation of armed conflict after the military coup in 2021. The vulnerability faced by IDPs in Myanmar, coupled with the impact of the recent military coup and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, has received little global attention. This study examined how military coup exacerbated the health and well-being of IDPs in Myanmar post the military coup. The study employed purposive sampling and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) referrals to find participants. Qualitative in-depth telephone interviews were conducted with a total of 17 IDPs. A thematic analysis of the findings indicates that IDPs experience anxiety and fear daily, adversely affecting their mental health due to the increased escalation of armed conflict and attacks on civilian places, including IDPs shelters. Some IDPs contract COVID-19 and suffer from malaria and dengue fever owing to their precarious living conditions. Moreover, the military's restrictions on humanitarian aid distribution, including healthcare, medicine, and food, have severely impacted the health and well-being of IDPs in Myanmar, exacerbating food shortages and limiting healthcare access.

Abstract The political handling of Venezuelan forced migration in Ecuador has evolved since 2017. This article distinguishes three stages in this evolution. First, from 2017 to mid‐2018, Ecuadorian authorities treated Venezuelan entries as those of other South American citizens. Second, from mid‐2018 to mid‐2019, the Venezuelan exodus was managed as a humanitarian crisis. In the third phase, since mid‐2019, authorities imposed restrictive measures, including a mandatory entry visa. The article further identifies the drivers that have motivated these changes in the reception of Venezuelan migrants, that is the political, social and economic factors that directly or indirectly effected migration management. These factors include both changing foreign policy interests and adjustments in domestic policy. The latter was influenced by strained state capacities and negative trends in public opinion against the backdrop of increasing numbers of Venezuelan migrants and highly mediatized crimes. The article also discusses related literature and provides policy recommendations.

Abstract Local integration has long been seen as the “forgotten” durable solution to refugee displacement1 evidenced by the reluctance of governments across the world to accord refugees a new citizenship. This article goes further. It argues that local integration as a durable solution has not been merely forgotten, but deliberately avoided at a national, regional and international level. As a result, its veracity as a realistic durable solution for the majority of refugees is now in question. The article examines ways in which states seek to evade local integration. It begins by investigating the multiple tactics used by wealthier governments to elude responsibility both at a national level and through the influence they exert over global refugee responses. It then explores how countries hosting the greatest numbers of refugees, with a specific focus on Africa, have allowed significant numbers of refugees into their territory but have then maintained a short-term approach that has, in practice, blocked local integration as a durable solution. We argue that a mix of global, national, and local processes and forces have effectively conspired to diminish local integration as a durable solution to the point that it has all but vanished from the political arena. The implications for refugee populations of these processes and forces – talked of collectively as the politics of evasion – are profound. While refugees continue to find ways to negotiate their own access to communities and labour markets, this is often done against national, regional, and international policies rather than with them. Ultimately, by highlighting its value as a durable solution, while showing that there is almost uniform acceptance by states and international organisations working on protection concerns that it is no longer politically viable, this article hopes to restart an urgent conversation about the value of local integration and how it can be reinvigorated.

The flurry of interest around the European refugee crisis, whilst plainly justified, should not have the effect of distracting international attention from equally pressing humanitarian and refugee crises in other parts of the world. As such, this article highlights the extreme nature and scale of gang violence in the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, which has resulted in substantial forced displacement of affected populations. The article argues that, despite certain commonalities with situations of internal armed conflict (such as Syria), the scenario in the Northern Triangle poses a distinct set of additional challenges for ensuring the protection of refugees and displaced persons from these countries. The urgent need to address these challenges in the Americas is no less than for those presented by the current refugee crisis in Europe.

The aim of this article is to analyse the three solidarity programmes in the Mexico Plan of Action (MPA) – the responsibility sharing programme for regional resettlement, the integration of refugees into safe communities, and the development of border regions. The MPA is a step forward in strengthening the protection of human rights and the affirmation of the universality of human dignity. The MPA's objectives and programmes promote responsibility both at the regional level, through the notions of international solidarity and shared responsibility, and at the international level, as cooperation at a regional level could encourage similar initiatives in other regions.

This research draws on interviews conducted with asylum-seekers detained in Immigration Removal Centres in a number of locations across the United Kingdom, and explores how they, as subjects, perceive and experience immigration law. What is revealed is that individuals’ experience of law is largely influenced by a variety of non-legal factors which lawyers may not readily engage with on a regular basis. Law here appears to manifest as rumour and suggestion rather than a definitive set of rules and procedures, and is perceived as being coloured by lies and deception on the part of the various stakeholders involved. Participants display differing modes of legal consciousness, in which their experiences of “law” blur with their everyday experiences inside and outside the detention estate. Many present themselves concurrently as passive victims of an unjust and inaccessible system, and equally as active, knowledgeable legal subjects, in seemingly contradictory ways. Permeating all these narratives is the description of immigration detention as a “desert island”, a space that is isolated and remote, and imbued with uncertainty and often fear, a space which appears to be outside the jurisdiction of “law” as lawyers would readily understand it.

Background: Young people are increasingly seeking employment in the informal sector due to increasing global unemployment. However, the precarious nature of work in the informal sectors, coupled with the high risk of occupational hazards, calls for a greater need for effective healthcare for informal sector workers, particularly young people. In addressing the health vulnerabilities of informal workers, systematic data on the determinants of health is a persistent challenge. Therefore, the objective of this systematic review was to identify and summarise the existing factors that affect access to healthcare among young people from the informal sector. Methods: We searched six data databases (PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, ProQuest, Crossref, and Google Scholar), which was followed by hand searching. Then we screened the identified literature using review-specific inclusion/exclusion criteria, extracted data from the included studies and assessed study quality. Then we presented the results in narrative form, though meta-analysis was not possible due to heterogeneity in the study design. Results: = 9); four were conducted in Africa, and one in South America. Samples ranged in size from 120 to 2,726. The synthesised results demonstrate that problems of affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability of healthcare were barriers to young informal workers seeking healthcare. We found social networks and health insurance as facilitators of access for this group of people. Conclusion: To date, this is the most comprehensive review of the evidence on access to healthcare for young people in the informal sector. Our study finding highlights the key gaps in knowledge where future research could further illuminate the mechanisms through which social networks and the determinants of access to healthcare could influence the health and well-being of young people and thus inform policy development.

Disasters and conflicts are both widely recognised as 'drivers' of internal displacement. Yet, despite a growing body of research and policy, there has been little consideration to date of how the different features of each 'context' shape the micro-level dynamics of internal displacement. Where and why are these dynamics similar across the two contexts and how do they differ? This paper draws on general concepts from the disaster field to develop a comparative analytical model of internal displacement dynamics in the disaster and conflict contexts. Based on inferences from the patchy extant data across the two contexts, it identifies and explains points of convergence and divergence between internal displacement dynamics in both the disaster and conflict contexts. This 'contextual' model of the micro-level dynamics of internal displacement has implications for academic debates, as well as for policy and practice, in the disaster, conflict, peace, climate change, and forced migration/displacement fields.

The “scandal” of foreign criminals whom our governments cannot send back to their own countries has become something of a tabloid obsession. Yet, while suspected or convicted of serious crimes or considered to pose a danger to society, such “undesirable and unreturnable” aliens equally often languish in an ambiguous and even dangerous state of protracted legal “limbo”, lacking a defined immigration status and attendant access to basic rights in the host State. In the absence of an agreed common framework for resolving this anomalous situation, how do individual States deal with the legal and policy paradox that is embodied by these purportedly “undesirable”, but also ultimately non-removable, aliens? This Special Issue offers a preliminary perspective on this contemporary concern by presenting eight specially commissioned pieces of new research. Each of the contributions examines a different national context where this issue has arisen in recent years, resulting in eight detailed country case studies covering Australia, Canada, France, Greece, India, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The aim is to produce a comparative understanding of national responses in this relatively diverse range of countries.

A novel set of protections for refugees and asylum-seekers exists within the Inter-American human rights system, the scope of which has been developed considerably in recent years through the jurisprudence of its institutions. Whilst these advances have attracted comparatively little academic commentary, and are relatively unknown even among practitioners in the region, the present article shows that they offer an important new model for integrating principles of both refugee and complementary protection. This article contributes to a wider literature on the relationship between the regime established by international refugee law and the complementary protection regimes that have emerged in human rights law for persons who have international protection needs despite not being refugees. By describing and analysing the distinct strands of the generous Inter-American standards relating to refugees and asylum-seekers, the article explores both their positive implications and interpretative challenges for the future of asylum in the Americas.

This article examines the extent to which progress has been made towards achieving greater consistency in refugee law decision-making. It is pointed out that consistency is not necessarily an end in itself and is only a virtue in the service of fair and just decision-making. The backdrop to the article is the fact that many recent studies have highlighted that decision-making is still too much of a lottery. In order to aid analysis use is made of the distinction between two dimensions of a claim for asylum: the individual dimension and the country dimension. Applying this distinction it is suggested that the world of refugee decision-making can be divided into three segments: decision-making by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; non-European decision-making; and European decision-making.

Access to vaccinations is crucial for everyone in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, regardless of migration or refugee status. This study explored COVID-19 prevention knowledge, attitudes, and vaccination challenges among refugees and irregular migrants from Myanmar in Malaysia. This study employed a descriptive mixed-method approach. Convenience sampling was used to conduct an online survey of 174 participants and two focus groups (N = 14). The majority (51.7 %) were refugees, and 48% were irregular migrant workers. In this study, 90.9% of the participants used social networks and social media chats to obtain information about COVID-19, 84.1% understood and found the vaccination campaign helpful, and 44.2% were aware of it. Although 70% of the participants considered vaccination crucial, 95% said that they would not take it because of fear of arrest and deportation, even though they considered vaccination necessary. Approximately 21.2% of the workers reported that their employers did not provide masks or hand sanitisers. Most of the participants (39.7 %) lived in dormitories provided by their employers. This puts them at a higher risk of infection because of the difficulty in practising social distancing. As part of COVID-19 prevention, the government should grant an amnesty period and work with migrant civil society organisations to administer vaccinations and effective measures for all immigrant populations in Malaysia.

In late 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Migration Compact). The groundwork for those texts was laid by the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which drew on a report by the UN Secretary-General earlier that year.1 After almost three years of negotiations and debate, the two Global Compacts look close to becoming a reality. For the refugee field, these negotiations represent a significant global ‘moment’. Indeed, the Refugee Compact looks to be one of the most significant additions in decades to the refugee regime (the body of international instruments, institutions, and mechanisms on refugees). But, in big picture terms, what does the Refugee Compact tell us about the global refugee regime and its future? Two areas of potential impact immediately suggest themselves as worthy of further investigation. One consequence of the process outlined above was to locate ideas about ‘fairness’ more centrally within refugee debates. Indeed, in 2016, a good measure of the excitement in refugee protection circles coalesced around the view that the New York Declaration might opt to redress what some had long seen as a flaw in the refugee ‘system’, namely the failure of refugee law to adequately share the ‘burden’ of refugees at the global level. The hope that the New York Declaration process might offer an opportunity to negotiate a ‘fairer’ refugee regime increasingly seemed to become almost a staple of the discourse surrounding it. For some, the New York Declaration’s failure to adopt a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General that States commit to resettling 10 per cent of the world’s refugees dashed this hope. Nonetheless, we should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. The more technical ‘arrangements’ on responsibility sharing that appear in the Refugee Compact (paras 14–48) do have the potential to facilitate new cooperative actions, even in the absence of a general obligation in this regard. However modestly, within the ‘politics of the possible’, they do start to engage with the notion of ‘fairness’ in global refugee policy. The focus on fairness that this process has helped to ensconce in refugee protection debates raises crucial questions for the refugee regime in the longer term. One is the actual significance of such a concept of ‘fairness’ within the refugee regime, especially given the tension with a longstanding unwillingness by States to codify a global obligation to share responsibility for refugees.2 Another key question concerns the extent to which the global refugee regime, and its operation, is (or can be) insulated from wider political, geographic, and economic inequalities in the international system. The Refugee Compact is distinct from the Migration Compact in that it builds upon a robust international regime that, whatever its shortcomings, is well established in its fundamentals. Yet the opportunity to breathe new life into an apparently tired regime by designing a new global instrument, even if legally non-binding, also creates risks for the existing regime, especially were the Refugee Compact perceived to ‘fail’. Association is not a one-way street. Thus, just as the refugee regime provides a foundation for the Refugee Compact, so, too, the success or failure of the Compact may impact upon the legitimacy of the underlying regime. The prospects appear daunting. Even prior to its consideration by the UN General Assembly, some in the field already appeared ready to judge the Refugee Compact as a let-down. Robust debate is required on whether the risks inherent in the process of its negotiation were adequately addressed within the ‘politics of the possible’ in order to learn from the process and move forward. Yet, at the same time, it is crucial to engage with the Compact as a reality that, for better or for worse, may have direct implications for the legitimacy of the wider refugee regime. Certainly, the Refugee Compact’s four objectives (para 7) seem broadly unobjectionable. Its Programme of Action (Part III) includes technical measures that offer at least the appearance of new pathways to promote cooperation in this field. The Compact also outlines follow-up and review procedures (Part IV). Yet, whilst these provide parameters for action in situations where the Refugee Compact is applied, measuring its overall impact is a more complex exercise. In this regard, the Compact remains something of a work in progress, with the criteria for its own success not yet fully established (perhaps purposefully). This fact points to a fertile terrain of future debate in the refugee field. Against the backdrop of the links between the Refugee Compact and the existing refugee regime, how is ‘success’ or ‘failure’ to be constructed and determined generally (or, indeed, by different groups of States and other ‘stakeholders’)? What implications exist for the global refugee regime as a consequence? And will newly energized ideas, such as ‘fairness’, prove relevant to the assessment? The enquiries are not merely academic but offer a window onto whether the refugee regime has a future and, if so, what shape that may take. A definitive assessment of how the Refugee Compact will impact on refugee protection in practice will be possible only once it is put into action. Nonetheless, the Compact, the New York Declaration, and their processes of negotiation have already begun to reshape the regime in subtle ways by starting to shift the terms of debate. Within the refugee regime, they bring to the fore such big picture issues as fairness between States, its relationship to wider inequalities in international relations, and claims to legitimacy of the regime overall. Whether they will be able to help address those challenges remains to be seen. The author has previously worked for UNHCR, including on issues related to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. The author gratefully acknowledges input from Jean-François Durieux, Nicholas Maple, Penelope Mathew, and Sarah Singer. Any errors remain the responsibility of the author alone.

Abstract The rapid increase in the number of refugees arriving to Greece in 2015 and the subsequent moves by the European Union Member States to limit their secondary movement triggered what has been described as the “most expensive humanitarian response in history.” The European Commission, believing that Greece did not have the capacity to respond to the situation, directly funded international organisations, primarily the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and international non-governmental organisations to do so. The “care and maintenance model” at the core of UNHCR’s response to protracted refugee situations has been described as a “surrogate state,” complete with the territory, services, and citizens. This article aimed to examine whether this refugee response in Greece followed the “surrogate state” model which characterised interventions in other geographies, by studying UNHCR’s service provision, governance functions, perception of legitimacy, territorial presence and influence. This study shows that this refugee response was characterised by a degree of surrogacy that resembles the “surrogate states” observed in other refugee responses. The Greek government was marginalised during the response and abdicated a significant degree of responsibility to UNHCR. This negatively affected the quality of the response itself and the long-term welfare and prospects of refugees.

Abstract Humanitarian accountability has been the subject of increased attention in recent years. However, examination of how its principles and practices play out in displacement contexts is an under-explored area. In this Editorial, we outline the development of humanitarian accountability standards and practice, with particular focus on their applicability to displacement contexts. As we refer to and introduce the papers of this special issue, we reflect on positive developments and the challenges remaining. It is a particularly prescient time to reflect on the ‘state of play’ of accountability in this sector, given it is five years since the adoption of the Grand Bargain and the “Participation Revolution”, through which stakeholders undertook to increase the relevance and efficiency of humanitarian response by giving prominence to affected populations’ participation in decisions which affect their lives. Despite these commitments, however, true progress is hampered by entrenched power imbalances. In the pyramid of power relations which denote the power to influence programming, displaced populations remain at the bottom, often unheard and silenced. Yet, only when displaced communities are able to influence the kind of aid they receive, can humanitarian responses truly address their needs and pave the way for more secure, protected and resilient communities.

The issue of migrants convicted or suspected of serious criminality is one that has been high on the media and political agenda in the United Kingdom in the past two decades. This article focuses on three categories of (suspected) criminal migrants – foreign national offenders, individuals considered to pose a security risk, and those excluded from refugee status under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention – outlining the scale and demographic of these groups in the United Kingdom, governmental measures taken to facilitate their removal and the consequences for those that nevertheless remain. This examination reveals that, despite the UK’s emphasis on removal, legal obstacles and administrative problems continue to frustrate many attempts to remove such persons. As a result, large numbers of individuals are released into the community or remain in detention for often prolonged periods of time. In the case of excluded asylum-seekers, these individuals are subject to an extremely precarious form of leave. The result is these “undesirable” migrants remain in a form of “limbo”, with no firm legal status and the prospect of removal ever present. If the emphasis remains on removal rather than looking to alternative in-country solutions that are more than temporary in nature, a viable solution to this issue is likely to remain elusive.

Abstract The three durable solutions (resettlement, local integration, and repatriation) are out of reach to most refugees. Even when they are offered, they are often watered down or repackaged, so that their durability has been undermined. This paper examines their contemporary role and framing and proposes an urgent recalibration of our understanding of the solutions based around three interlinked elements. First, to recover the core function of all three durable solutions, namely the (re)gaining of citizenship; in order, second, to shift the conversation away from assumptions about the sedentary nature of durable solutions; which, third, draws out a greater understanding of the potential collaboration and connections between these traditional solutions and ground-level solutions that refugees create for themselves. We argue that not only are each of these elements important in and of themselves, but they also need to be viewed as indivisible.