Max Planck Institute for Human Development

A crucial part of statistical analysis is evaluating a model's quality and fit, or performance. During analysis, especially with regression models, investigating the fit of models to data also often involves selecting the best fitting model amongst many competing models. Upon investigation, fit indices should also be reported both visually and numerically to bring readers in on the investigative effort.

This paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects' homes. Using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks "in general", we find that gender, age, height, and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks. The experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure, using paid lottery choices. Turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts, we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes, and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts. We conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks, occupational choice, and smoking. The question about risk taking in general generates the best all-round predictor of risky behavior.

As reflected in the amount of controversy, few areas in psychology have undergone such dramatic conceptual changes in the past decade as the emerging science of heuristics. Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information. Because using heuristics saves effort, the classical view has been that heuristic decisions imply greater errors than do "rational" decisions as defined by logic or statistical models. However, for many decisions, the assumptions of rational models are not met, and it is an empirical rather than an a priori issue how well cognitive heuristics function in an uncertain world. To answer both the descriptive question ("Which heuristics do people use in which situations?") and the prescriptive question ("When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make better judgments?"), formal models are indispensable. We review research that tests formal models of heuristic inference, including in business organizations, health care, and legal institutions. This research indicates that (a) individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and (b) ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information, for instance for low predictability and small samples. The big future challenge is to develop a systematic theory of the building blocks of heuristics as well as the core capacities and environmental structures these exploit.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we review research on the nature of psychological aging in terms of seven propositions. Second, we present a psychological model for the study of successful aging that, we contend, is consistent with the propositional framework. The approach advanced is based on the premise that successful, individual development (including aging) is a process involving three components: selection, optimization, and compensation. How these components of adaption are realized depends on the specific personal and societal circumstances individuals face and produce as they age.

Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisfying, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors held a competition between the satisfying "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result in an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference.

To survive in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury, decision-makers must use bounded rationality. In this precis of Simple heuristics that make us smart, we explore fast and frugal heuristics—simple rules for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics enable smart choices to be made quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. Despite limiting information search and processing, simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data—simplicity leads to robustness.

Brain aging research relies mostly on cross-sectional studies, which infer true changes from age differences. We present longitudinal measures of five-year change in the regional brain volumes in healthy adults. Average and individual differences in volume changes and the effects of age, sex and hypertension were assessed with latent difference score modeling. The caudate, the cerebellum, the hippocampus and the association cortices shrunk substantially. There was minimal change in the entorhinal and none in the primary visual cortex. Longitudinal measures of shrinkage exceeded cross-sectional estimates. All regions except the inferior parietal lobule showed individual differences in change. Shrinkage of the cerebellum decreased from young to middle adulthood, and increased from middle adulthood to old age. Shrinkage of the hippocampus, the entorhinal cortices, the inferior temporal cortex and the prefrontal white matter increased with age. Moreover, shrinkage in the hippocampus and the cerebellum accelerated with age. In the hippocampus, both linear and quadratic trends in incremental age-related shrinkage were limited to the hypertensive participants. Individual differences in shrinkage correlated across some regions, suggesting common causes. No sex differences in age trends except for the caudate were observed. We found no evidence of neuroprotective effects of larger brain size or educational attainment.

In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies by Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath. Published in volume 91, issue 2, pages 73-78 of American Economic Review, May 2001

In both the United States and Europe, concerns have been raised about whether preservice and in-service training succeeds in equipping teachers with the professional knowledge they need to deliver consistently high-quality instruction. This article investigates the significance of teachers’ content knowledge and pedagogical content knowledge for high-quality instruction and student progress in secondary-level mathematics. It reports findings from a 1-year study conducted in Germany with a representative sample of Grade 10 classes and their mathematics teachers. Teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge was theoretically and empirically distinguishable from their content knowledge. Multilevel structural equation models revealed a substantial positive effect of pedagogical content knowledge on students’ learning gains that was mediated by the provision of cognitive activation and individual learning support.

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an "adaptive toolbox;" and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people's adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.

A life-span theory of development is presented that is based on the concepts of primary and secondary control. Primary control refers to behaviors directed at the external environment and involves attempts to change the world to fit the needs and desires of the individual. Secondary control is targeted at internal processes and serves to minimize losses in, maintain, and expand existing levels of primary control. Secondary control helps the individual to cope with failure and fosters primary control by channeling motivational resources toward selected action goals throughout the life course. Primary control has functional primacy over secondary control. An analysis of extensive and diverse literatures spanning infancy through old age shows that trade-offs between primary and secondary control undergo systematic shifts across the life course in response to the opportunities and constraints encountered.

In the life story, autobiographical remembering and self-understanding are combined to create a coherent account of one's past. A gap is demonstrated between developmental research on the story-organization of autobiographical remembering of events in childhood and of life narratives in adulthood. This gap is bridged by substantiating D.P. McAdams's (1985) claim that the life story develops in adolescence. Two manifestations of the life story, life narratives and autobiographical reasoning, are delineated in terms of 4 types of global coherence (temporal, biographical, causal, and thematic). A review of research shows that the cognitive tools necessary for constructing global coherence in a life story and the social-motivational demands to construct a life story develop during adolescence. The authors delineate the implications of the life story framework for other research areas such as coping, attachment, psychotherapeutic process, and the organization of autobiographical memory.

This study investigates teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge, professional beliefs, work-related motivation, and self-regulation as aspects of their professional competence. Specifically, it examines how these aspects impact instruction and, in turn, student outcomes. In a nationally representative sample of 194 German secondary school mathematics classes, multiple measures were used to assess teacher competence, instructional quality, and students’ achievement and motivation. The effect of teachers’ professional competence on student outcomes was estimated in a 1-year repeated-measures design. Two-level structural equation models revealed positive effects of teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge, enthusiasm for teaching, and self-regulatory skills on instructional quality, which in turn affected student outcomes. In contrast, teachers’ general academic ability did not affect their instruction. The multidimensional model of teachers’ professional competence introduced in this article seems suited to stimulate further research on the personal indicators of teacher quality.

Drawing on both evolutionary and ontogenetic perspectives, the basic biological-genetic and social-cultural architecture of human development is outlined. Three principles are involved. First, evolutionary selection pressure predicts a negative age correlation, and therefore, genome-based plasticity and biological potential decrease with age. Second, for growth aspects of human development to extend further into the life span, culture-based resources are required at ever-increasing levels. Third, because of age-related losses in biological plasticity, the efficiency of culture is reduced as life span development unfolds. Joint application of these principles suggests that the life span architecture becomes more and more incomplete with age. Degree of completeness can be defined as the ratio between gains and losses in functioning. Two examples illustrate the implications of the life span architecture proposed. The first is a general theory of development involving the orchestration of 3 component processes: selection, optimization, and compensation. The second considers the task of completing the life course in the sense of achieving a positive balance between gains and losses for all age levels. This goal is increasingly more difficult to attain as human development is extended into advanced old age.

Graphical displays can reveal problems in a statistical model that might not be apparent from purely numerical summaries. Such visualizations can also be helpful for the reader to evaluate the validity of a model if it is reported in a scholarly publication or report. But, given the onerous costs involved, researchers often avoid preparing information-rich graphics and exploring several statistical approaches or tests available. The ggstatsplot package in the R programming language (R Core Team, 2021) provides a one-line syntax to enrich ggplot2based visualizations with the results from statistical analysis embedded in the visualization itself. In doing so, the package helps researchers adopt a rigorous, reliable, and robust data exploratory and reporting workflow.

In this monograph, we ask whether various kinds of intellectual, physical, and social activities produce cognitive enrichment effects-that is, whether they improve cognitive performance at different points of the adult life span, with a particular emphasis on old age. We begin with a theoretical framework that emphasizes the potential of behavior to influence levels of cognitive functioning. According to this framework, the undeniable presence of age-related decline in cognition does not invalidate the view that behavior can enhance cognitive functioning. Instead, the course of normal aging shapes a zone of possible functioning, which reflects person-specific endowments and age-related constraints. Individuals influence whether they function in the higher or lower ranges of this zone by engaging in or refraining from beneficial intellectual, physical, and social activities. From this point of view, the potential for positive change, or plasticity, is maintained in adult cognition. It is an argument that is supported by newer research in neuroscience showing neural plasticity in various aspects of central nervous system functioning, neurochemistry, and architecture. This view of human potential contrasts with static conceptions of cognition in old age, according to which decline in abilities is fixed and individuals cannot slow its course. Furthermore, any understanding of cognition as it occurs in everyday life must make a distinction between basic cognitive mechanisms and skills (such as working-memory capacity) and the functional use of cognition to achieve goals in specific situations. In practice, knowledge and expertise are critical for effective functioning, and the available evidence suggests that older adults effectively employ specific knowledge and expertise and can gain new knowledge when it is required. We conclude that, on balance, the available evidence favors the hypothesis that maintaining an intellectually engaged and physically active lifestyle promotes successful cognitive aging. First, cognitive-training studies have demonstrated that older adults can improve cognitive functioning when provided with intensive training in strategies that promote thinking and remembering. The early training literature suggested little transfer of function from specifically trained skills to new cognitive tasks; learning was highly specific to the cognitive processes targeted by training. Recently, however, a new generation of studies suggests that providing structured experience in situations demanding executive coordination of skills-such as complex video games, task-switching paradigms, and divided attention tasks-train strategic control over cognition that does show transfer to different task environments. These studies suggest that there is considerable reserve potential in older adults' cognition that can be enhanced through training. Second, a considerable number of studies indicate that maintaining a lifestyle that is intellectually stimulating predicts better maintenance of cognitive skills and is associated with a reduced risk of developing Alzheimer's disease in late life. Our review focuses on longitudinal evidence of a connection between an active lifestyle and enhanced cognition, because such evidence admits fewer rival explanations of observed effects (or lack of effects) than does cross-sectional evidence. The longitudinal evidence consistently shows that engaging in intellectually stimulating activities is associated with better cognitive functioning at later points in time. Other studies show that meaningful social engagement is also predictive of better maintenance of cognitive functioning in old age. These longitudinal findings are also open to important rival explanations, but overall, the available evidence suggests that activities can postpone decline, attenuate decline, or provide prosthetic benefit in the face of normative cognitive decline, while at the same time indicating that late-life cognitive changes can result in curtailment of activities. Given the complexity of the dynamic reciprocal relationships between stimulating activities and cognitive function in old age, additional research will be needed to address the extent to which observed effects validate a causal influence of an intellectually engaged lifestyle on cognition. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that an active lifestyle that requires cognitive effort has long-term benefits for older adults' cognition is at least consistent with the available data. Furthermore, new intervention research that involves multimodal interventions focusing on goal-directed action requiring cognition (such as reading to children) and social interaction will help to address whether an active lifestyle enhances cognitive function. Third, there is a parallel literature suggesting that physical activity, and aerobic exercise in particular, enhances older adults' cognitive function. Unlike the literature on an active lifestyle, there is already an impressive array of work with humans and animal populations showing that exercise interventions have substantial benefits for cognitive function, particularly for aspects of fluid intelligence and executive function. Recent neuroscience research on this topic indicates that exercise has substantial effects on brain morphology and function, representing a plausible brain substrate for the observed effects of aerobic exercise and other activities on cognition. Our review identifies a number of areas where additional research is needed to address critical questions. For example, there is considerable epidemiological evidence that stress and chronic psychological distress are negatively associated with changes in cognition. In contrast, less is known about how positive attributes, such as self-efficacy, a sense of control, and a sense of meaning in life, might contribute to preservation of cognitive function in old age. It is well known that certain personality characteristics such as conscientiousness predict adherence to an exercise regimen, but we do not know whether these attributes are also relevant to predicting maintenance of cognitive function or effective compensation for cognitive decline when it occurs. Likewise, more information is needed on the factors that encourage maintenance of an active lifestyle in old age in the face of elevated risk for physiological decline, mechanical wear and tear on the body, and incidence of diseases with disabling consequences, and whether efforts to maintain an active lifestyle are associated with successful aging, both in terms of cognitive function and psychological and emotional well-being. We also discuss briefly some interesting issues for society and public policy regarding cognitive-enrichment effects. For example, should efforts to enhance cognitive function be included as part of a general prevention model for enhancing health and vitality in old age? We also comment on the recent trend of business marketing interventions claimed to build brain power and prevent age-related cognitive decline, and the desirability of direct research evidence to back claims of effectiveness for specific products.

More and more people live into old age. This demographic revolution underscores the fact that old age is the last uncharted and unattended phase of the life cycle. We know that old age is the last uncharted and unattended phase of the life cycle. We know very little about the strengths and weaknesses of old age or how to achieve a good balance between gains and losses, a meaningful conclusion to life. The fourth volume in a series sponsored by the European Science Foundation Network on Longitudinal Studies on Individual Development, Successful Aging presents in its first section general overviews on successful aging from psychological, sociological, and medical perspectives. The volume's second part focuses on selected areas of human functioning, such as intelligence, memory, athletics, life satisfaction, personal control, coping with illness and loss, widowhood, and mental health. The authors of the various chapters share in the view that aging is not identical with fate, but that individuals play a major role in designing their own process of aging

For researchers and practitioners interested in social relationships, the question remains as to how large social networks typically are, and how their size and composition change across adulthood. On the basis of predictions of socioemotional selectivity theory and social convoy theory, we conducted a meta-analysis on age-related social network changes and the effects of life events on social networks using 277 studies with 177,635 participants from adolescence to old age. Cross-sectional as well as longitudinal studies consistently showed that (a) the global social network increased up until young adulthood and then decreased steadily, (b) both the personal network and the friendship network decreased throughout adulthood, (c) the family network was stable in size from adolescence to old age, and (d) other networks with coworkers or neighbors were important only in specific age ranges. Studies focusing on life events that occur at specific ages, such as transition to parenthood, job entry, or widowhood, demonstrated network changes similar to such age-related network changes. Moderator analyses detected that the type of network assessment affected the reported size of global, personal, and family networks. Period effects on network sizes occurred for personal and friendship networks, which have decreased in size over the last 35 years. Together the findings are consistent with the view that a portion of normative, age-related social network changes are due to normative, age-related life events. We discuss how these patterns of normative social network development inform research in social, evolutionary, cultural, and personality psychology.

One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.

Many doctors, patients, journalists, and politicians alike do not understand what health statistics mean or draw wrong conclusions without noticing. Collective statistical illiteracy refers to the widespread inability to understand the meaning of numbers. For instance, many citizens are unaware that higher survival rates with cancer screening do not imply longer life, or that the statement that mammography screening reduces the risk of dying from breast cancer by 25% in fact means that 1 less woman out of 1,000 will die of the disease. We provide evidence that statistical illiteracy (a) is common to patients, journalists, and physicians; (b) is created by nontransparent framing of information that is sometimes an unintentional result of lack of understanding but can also be a result of intentional efforts to manipulate or persuade people; and (c) can have serious consequences for health. The causes of statistical illiteracy should not be attributed to cognitive biases alone, but to the emotional nature of the doctor-patient relationship and conflicts of interest in the healthcare system. The classic doctor-patient relation is based on (the physician's) paternalism and (the patient's) trust in authority, which make statistical literacy seem unnecessary; so does the traditional combination of determinism (physicians who seek causes, not chances) and the illusion of certainty (patients who seek certainty when there is none). We show that information pamphlets, Web sites, leaflets distributed to doctors by the pharmaceutical industry, and even medical journals often report evidence in nontransparent forms that suggest big benefits of featured interventions and small harms. Without understanding the numbers involved, the public is susceptible to political and commercial manipulation of their anxieties and hopes, which undermines the goals of informed consent and shared decision making. What can be done? We discuss the importance of teaching statistical thinking and transparent representations in primary and secondary education as well as in medical school. Yet this requires familiarizing children early on with the concept of probability and teaching statistical literacy as the art of solving real-world problems rather than applying formulas to toy problems about coins and dice. A major precondition for statistical literacy is transparent risk communication. We recommend using frequency statements instead of single-event probabilities, absolute risks instead of relative risks, mortality rates instead of survival rates, and natural frequencies instead of conditional probabilities. Psychological research on transparent visual and numerical forms of risk communication, as well as training of physicians in their use, is called for. Statistical literacy is a necessary precondition for an educated citizenship in a technological democracy. Understanding risks and asking critical questions can also shape the emotional climate in a society so that hopes and anxieties are no longer as easily manipulated from outside and citizens can develop a better-informed and more relaxed attitude toward their health.